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ADMIRALTY-TORTS-IN NONCOLLISION CASES CONTRIBUTION
WILL LIE WHERE No COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS DETRACT
FROM THE MARITIME RULE ALLOWING CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT
TORTFEASORS.
While loading a vessel operated by respondents,' a longshoreman' sustained
personal injuries when he stepped into a concealed gap between crates of cargo
previously loaded by petitioner.' The longshoreman brought suit in federal
district court for damages against respondents, who impleaded petitioner, al-
leging that if any injuries to the longshoreman were the result of negligence
other than his own, then such injury resulted from the negligence of petitioner.'
The district court found both parties at fault and divided the liability equally.
Petitioner appealed,' asserting that contribution is not available in a noncolli-
sion maritime case. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this
contention,' affirming the award because petitioner, not being the employer of
the longshoreman, was not shielded from liability.7 On a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Contribution in noncollision
cases will lie where no countervailing considerations detract from the well-
established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors.
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2174 (1974).
1 The vessel, the S.S. Karina, was owned by respondent Fritz Kopke and was under the time-
charter to respondent Alcoa Steamship Company.
2 The longshoreman, Troy Sessions, was an employee of Mid-Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
Petitioner Cooper Stevedoring Co. had loaded the vessel in Mobile, Alabama, before it
proceeded to Houston, Texas, where the injuries occurred.
I Respondents also filed a similar third-party complaint against the longshoreman's employer,
Mid-Gulf. Prior to trial Mid-Gulf agreed to indemnify respondents against any recovery the
longshoreman might obtain. Mid-Gulf was then dismissed as a defendant and Mid-Gulf's attorneys
were substituted as counsel for the respondents.
I Respondents also cross-appealed, claiming a right to full indemnity from petitioner on the
basis of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) [hereinafter Ryan]
(Stevedoring company obligated to indemnify shipowner for damages caused by Stevedore's im-
proper storage of cargo). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ryan did not apply here
since respondents had failed to fulfill their primary responsibility under the arrangement with
petitioner to assure that some type of dunnage was placed on top of the cargo. Sessions v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc., 479 F.2d 1041, 1042 (5th Cir. 1973).
Sessions v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 479 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970), as
amended, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b) (Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter cited as the Act]:
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury
or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required
by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results
from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an
action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such
action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employ-
ment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.
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While the common law has traditionally disallowed contribution among joint
tortfeasors,' in admiralty law such contribution is a well established rule in
collision cases involving mutual fault.' This rule pertaining to contribution in
vessel collision cases was subsequently expanded to cover cases involving colli-
sions between vessels and inanimate shore objects'0 and to cases involving cargo
damage or personal injury not resulting from collision." By 1922 it appeared
that American courts had finally laid to rest any distinction between collision
and noncollision cases in determining whether damages should be divided.'
However, this distinction was later resurrected in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Corp.3 A writ of certiorari had been granted in Halcyon" to clear up the
controversy raised by the passage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act." The Court denied the shipowner contribution from the
See W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 305 (4th ed. 1971).
See, e.g., The Washington, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 513 (1869); The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695 (1875).
This concept of contribution in admiralty cases can be traced as far back as the twelfth century
laws of Oleron. By 1815 this doctrine became firmly entrenched in English law in The Woodrop-
Sims, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (Adm. 1815). By way of dictum, Sir William Scott stated that where a
loss occurred through a collision between two vessels and both parties are to blame, the rule of
law was that the loss must be apportioned between them. Scott's dictum was adopted in the United
States by the Supreme Court in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170
(1854).
For a general discussion of the application of the doctrine in American courts, see Mr. Justice
Bradley's opinion in The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882), and Staring, Contribution and Division
of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 305 (1957).
11 Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874); Louis Dreyfuss v. Seaboard Great Lakes
Corp., 69 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1934).
11 For contribution in noncollision property damage cases, see The Bordentown, 16 F. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1883); Snow v. Carruth, 22 F. Cas. 724 (No. 13144) (D. Mass. 1856).
For division of damages in a noncollision personal injury case, see The Explorer, 20 F. 135
(C.C.E.D. La. 1884). See also The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890), where the Court cited several
district court cases as precedents for extending division of damages to noncollision cases: The
Steam Tug William Cox, 3 F. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1880), affd, 9 F. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); The Steam
Tug William Murtaugh, 3 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1880); The Syracuse, 18 F. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
" See White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922);
The Jethou, 2 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1924).
13 342 U.S. 282 (1952) [hereinafter Halcyon]. Haenn had been hired to make repairs on Hal-
cyon's ship, and an employee of Haenn sustained personal injuries due to the fault of both Halcyon
and Haenn. Suit was brought against Halcyon, who impleaded Haenn as a third-party defendant.
Although the jury returned a special verdict finding Haenn and Halcyon seventy-five and twenty-
five per cent at fault, respectively, judgment was entered dividing the liability equally. Baccile v.
Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951).
" 342 U.S. 809 (1951).
15 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970). See note 7 supra. The lower courts were undecided as to what
effect the Act had on the issue of contribution in cases involving an employer covered by this
statute. See American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950) (employer's
limitation of liability under the Act barred contribution); United States v. Rothchild Int'l Stevedor-
ing Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950) (the Act did not bar contribution because the employer knew
of defect and failed to warn employee); Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951)
(contribution allowed but limited to the amount which the injured employee could have compelled
the employer to pay had he elected to claim compensation under the Act).
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injured workman's employer but did so in a manner which did not make clear
its grounds for denial. The Court did not specifically say that the statutory
immunity provided to the employer under the Act would preclude contribu-
tion," but said instead "that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new
judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await
congressional action."' 7 In addition, in what came to be known as the Halcyon
dictum, the Court threw the law into a considerable state of confusion by
stating that the contribution rule had not yet been extended to noncollision
maritime cases in general.'"
Numerous lower courts, relying on the Halcyon dictum, adopted the view
that Halcyon stood for no contribution in noncollision cases." The Fifth Circuit
In American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1946), the Supreme Court avoided a
direct ruling on the effect of the Act by reversing the holding of the court of appeals that the Act
precluded contribution where the statutory immunity factor is present. The Court found that an
express indemnity clause in the contract between the two joint tortfeasors and not the Act itself
was the major issue in the case.
11 It is significant that the author of Halcyon, Mr. Justice Black, expressly asserted in Italia
Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting), that Halcyon stood
for the proposition that the Act precluded contribution:
• . .[Wie held that a system of compensation which Congress established in the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (citation omitted) as the sole
liability of a stevedoring company to its employees prevented a shipowner from shifting
all or part of his liability to the injured longshoreman onto the stevedoring company,
the longshoreman's employer.
,7 342 U.S. at 285. Congressional action, however, was not forthcoming. Four bills dealing with
this issue were introduced in the period from Halcyon to present: S. 2312, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H.R. 7911, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); S. 555, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 1070,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Not one was reported out of committee.
' 342 U.S. at 284:
Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is established admiralty doctrine
that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by each, as well
as personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third parties. This mari-
time rule is of ancient origin and has been applied in many cases, but this Court has
never expressly applied it to noncollision cases. Halcyon now urges us to extend it to
noncollision cases and to allow a contribution here based upon the relative degree of
fault of Halcyon and Haenn as found by the jury. (emphasis added)
In holding that "this Court has never expressly applied it to noncollision cases," Justice Black
obviously overlooked the decisions in The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890), and White Oak Transp.
Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922). See notes I I and 12 supra.
" See Mendez v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 421 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1970); King v. Waterman
Steamship, 272 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1959); Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1953); Saus
v. Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Nickert v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge
Co., 335 F. Supp. 1158 (W.D. Wash. 1972); In Re Standard Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American President Lines, 345 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
Remarkably, the Supreme Court itself circumvented the Halcyon decision by use of an indemn-
ity theory in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). A longshoreman
covered by the Act sued a shipowner for personal injuries sustained, alleging unseaworthiness of
the ship. The shipowner filed a third- party indemnity action against the longshoreman's em-
ployer. The Court decided in favor of the shipowner, finding an independent contractual obligation
on the part of the employer in promising to stow cargo "with reasonable safety." Hence, a breach
1975]
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Court of Appeals openly disputed this conclusion. On two occasionsl° the court
held that Halcyon stated a limited rule that contribution would not be allowed
in noncollision cases from a statutorily immune joint tortfeasor. Similarly, the
Second Circuit affirmed the Halcyon dictum in Benazet v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R.,11 a case involving statutory immunity. But faced with a different situa-
tion, where the statutory immunity factor was absent, the Second Circuit al-
tered its interpretation of Halcyon, allowing contribution in In Re Seaboard
Shipping Corp." Both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court; a writ of
certiorari was granted in Benazet23 but was denied in Seaboard.Y
This discrepancy in granting certiorari appeared to indicate that the Supreme
Court was not yet willing to make a definitive statement on the issues raised
by Halcyon. The opinion affirming Benazet merely implied that Halcyon must
be limited to the facts in the case. In fact, had the Court intended to affirm
Halcyon without any reservations, it should have denied certiorari since the
facts in the two cases were essentially the same. 5 Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc.2 presented the Court with another opportunity to rectify the
confusion created by the Halcyon decision. In Cooper Stevedoring the Court
stated: ". . . Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than the absolute bar
of contract action accrued to the shipowner aside from any tort action; the entire loss was shifted
from the tortious shipowner to the tortious stevedoring company, who under Halcyon could not
have been liable. Justice Black authored a vigorous dissent, asserting that the Court was undermin-
ing the Halcyon rationale. Ryan, id. at 135 (Black, J., dissenting).
The Ryan indemnity doctrine was followed and even extended by some courts. See Federal
Marine Terminals Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 488 (1969); Italia Societa v. Oregon
Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364
U.S. 421 (1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 353 U.S. 563 (1958). See generally Milbum, Halcyon
Revisited: Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors in Non-Collision Maritime Cases, INSTITUTE
OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION IN GEORGIA, SEMINAR ON ADMIRALTY LAW, ATLANTA, 1972,
at DM-I (1972).
2 Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J.E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 993 (1970); Watz v. Zapata Offshore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970).
21 422 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1971), affd per curiam sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Erie
Lackawanna R.R., 406 U.S. 340 (1972) [hereinafter Benazet]. The facts here were essentially the
same as those in Halcyon. Plaintiff Benazet, an employee of Erie, sued Atlantic for the personal
injuries he incurred while working on a box car owned by Atlantic. Atlantic, in turn, sought
contribution from Erie as a joint tortfeasor, but its contention was squarely rejected on the author-
ity of Halcyon.
- 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. deniedsub nom. Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Moran Inland
Waterways Corp., 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
- 404 U.S. 909 (1971). The Court affirmed in a surprising one-line opinion: "We agree that in
this noncollision admiralty case the District Court properly dismissed petitioner's third party
complaint for contribution against respondent Erie on the authority of Halcyon ... "(citation
omitted) 406 U.S. 340 (1972). (emphasis added)
24 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
2 This same implication is at least suggested by the denial of certiorari in Seaboard. See
generally Allbritton, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Non-Collision Maritime Cases, 4
J. MARITIME L. 425 (1972).
N 94 S. Ct. 2174 (1974) [hereinafter Cooper Stevedoring].
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against contribution in noncollision cases. . . ."2 In the opinion of the Court
Halcyon was still good law, but the Court limited its application to situations
where the party from whom contribution was sought was statutorily immune
from direct tort liability. 8 The Court found none of the countervailing consid-
erations present in Halcyon and Benazet to "detract from the well established
maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors. ' ' 1
Since Cooper Stevedoring has applied the division of damage rule to a
noncollision case, the practical effect will be to affirm the contribution rule in
maritime cases generally, subject to the Halcyon limitation. The ultimate rea-
son for allowing contribution is compelling. It is obviously unjust to force one
negligent party to pay the entire award when another has contributed to the
injury. This injustice is magnified by the fact that the injured party can indiscri-
minately choose which of the joint tortfeasors he wishes to sue. Moreover, there
appears to be no valid distinction between collision and noncollision cases
generally, since no noteworthy distinction was ever drawn until the Halcyon
decision. The only rationale given there for making such a distinction was that
the Court had never directly applied the contribution rule to noncollision
cases
.30
Although Cooper Stevedoring abolishes this distinction, the decision falters
in two respects. First, the Court states that Halcyon stands for a limited rule3'
without expressly defining that rule."2 The problem is compounded since the
rule is not even apparent from a reading of Halcyon itself. 33 The Court in
" Id. at 2177.
n The Act, which provides an injured workman's employer with such immunity, was amended
in 1972 to rectify the injustices resulting from the Ryan indemnity doctrine. The amended statute
reads in part:
(b) In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence
of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason
thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the
provisions of section 933 of this title and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel
for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary
shall be void.
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b) (Supp. II, 1972),
amending 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
n 94 S. Ct. at 2178.
' See note 18 supra.
3' 94 S. Ct. at 2177. The Court held that ... Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than
the absolute bar against contribution in noncollision cases. .. "
' The Court merely implies that the Halcyon rule disallows contribution between joint tortfea-
sors where the one from whom contribution is sought is statutorily immune from liability. This
implication is apparent from the Court's affirmation of the circuit court's decision, which held this
to be the Halcyon rule. Sessions v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 479 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974). The court of
appeals had relied upon earlier Fifth and Second Circuit decisions which interpreted Halcyon in a
like manner. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
3 Aside from stating the Halcyon dictum (apparently holding that there is no right of contribu-
tion in noncollision cases), the Court refused to allow contribution since Congress had made no
provisions for the effect the Act should have on contribution in this factual situation. 342 U.S. at
286.
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Cooper Stevedoring had the opportunity to define the Halcyon rule but chose
not to do so. Instead, it has obviously abrogated this responsibility to the courts
of appeals. With no high court pronouncement on this issue, the door may now
be open to confusion, just as Halcyon opened the door to twenty years of
inconsistent interpretations.
Second, more confusion may result from the Court's use of the phrase
"countervailing consideration. "m Cooper Stevedoring establishes statutory
immunity as one such consideration, but are there others? Naturally, the Court
is under no obligation to list every possible factor which might disallow contri-
bution, but the Court's failure to be more explicit could conceivably leave the
lower courts struggling.
Personal injury suits in admiralty are frequently presented to the lower
courts, and these courts need some positive guidance as to the handling of
contribution claims. Should confusion result from the Cooper Stevedoring
Court's failure to provide this guidance, then hopefully the Supreme Court will




u The Court stated: "On the facts of this case, then, no countervailing considerations detract
from the well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors." 94 S. Ct.
at 2178.
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